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Abstract
Arora, Barak, Brunnermeier, and Ge [ABBG11] showed that taking computational complexity into
account, a dishonest seller could strategically place lemons in financial derivatives to make them substan-
tially less valuable to buyers. We show that if the seller is required to construct derivatives of a certain
form, then this phenomenon disappears. In particular, we define and construct pseudorandom derivative
families, for which lemon placement only slightly affects the values of the derivatives. Our constructions
use expander graphs.
We study our derivatives in a more general setting than Arora et al. In particular, we analyze arbitrary
tranches of the common collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) when the underlying assets can have
significant dependencies.
Keywords: pseudorandom, finance, derivative, expander graph.
1 Introduction
Financial derivatives play a major role in our financial system, as became all too apparent in the 2008
financial crisis. A derivative is a financial product whose value is a function of one or more underlying
assets. They can be used to hedge risk, provide leverage, or simply to speculate. The major benefit of
derivatives is that they facilitate the buying and selling of risk.
While a derivative may depend on only one asset, in this paper we study derivatives that depend on
many assets, specifically, collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs. Over $500 billion of CDOs were issued
in 2006, but CDOs played a major role in the financial crisis. Issuance plummeted after the financial crisis
but in 2014 over $100 billion of CDOs were issued, and the numbers continue to grow [Buc17].
The structure of a CDO is quite intuitive. A CDO packages many underlying assets into tranches. For
example, a CDO could have 100 underlying mortgages, each of which is supposed to pay $1,000. The
“senior” tranche, for instance, could collect the first $85,000. Thus, if more than $85,000 is paid from
these 100 mortgages, this tranche receives $85,000; if some amount x ≤ $85, 000 is paid, the tranche
receives x. The next tranche could range from $85,000 to $95,000. If more than $95,000 is paid, this
∗An extended abstract of this paper appeared in EC’11.
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tranche receives the full $10,000; if less than $85,000 is paid, this tranche receives nothing. If the amount x
paid is between $85,000 and $95,000, then the tranche receives x − $85,000. In general, the [a, b] tranche
receives min(x, b) − min(x, a). Note that senior tranches can be much safer than the underlying assets,
which is part of the lure.
This paper focuses on such derivatives in the context of asymmetric information. Akerlof introduced a
framework to study such asymmetric information, using the market for used cars to capture the main ideas
[Ake70]. Here we follow the simplified discussion in Arora et al. [ABBG11]. There is an information
asymmetry in that a seller knows whether a car is a lemon, i.e., functions poorly and is worth nothing,
whereas a buyer cannot detect this with a short test drive. Imagine that a functional used car is worth $1000,
but everybody knows that 20% of used cars are lemons. A buyer would be willing to pay at most $800 for
a car that he thought had a 20% chance of being a lemon, but a seller who knows that her car is not a lemon
would not be willing to sell it for this price. In order for a sale to take place, the buyer’s value must be $200
more than the seller’s value, and this is called the “lemon cost.”
Let’s examine how asymmetric information affects CDOs. A seller may be aware that certain underlying
assets are lemons, and try to strategically place the lemons among the derivatives in order to minimize the
derivatives’ value. However, many believed that since the seller usually retains the junior tranches which
take the first losses, the senior tranches are less vulnerable to such manipulation, giving smaller lemon cost
(see, e.g., [DeM04]).
Arora, Barak, Brunnermeier, and Ge [ABBG11] introduced computational complexity into this discus-
sion. They showed that contrary to the conventional wisdom, once computational complexity is accounted
for, the lemon costs of derivatives could increase dramatically, at least under a plausible computational
assumption. Indeed, in the 2008 financial crisis, it appears that sellers did pack lemons into their CDOs
without buyers’ knowledge; for an entertaining account see Michael Lewis’s The Big Short [Lew10].
Before describing how we get around this problem, we first describe the setting of Arora et al. There
are n assets and m derivatives, where each derivative is a function of r underlying assets. We will have
n ≪ mr, so that each asset underlies several derivatives. This is typically not the case if the underlying
assets are, say, mortgages; however, in the common case that the underlying assets are credit default swaps,
it is often the case that an asset underlies several derivatives. Alternatively, we can replace each asset with
an asset class of similarly performing assets, such as mortgages from the same market, and now duplicates
correspond to samples from the same asset class. Arora et al. go back and forth between assets and asset
classes; for simplicity we stick to assets.
Arora et al. model the relationship between derivatives and underlying assets as a bipartite graph. The
nodes are the derivatives and assets, and there is an edge between a derivative and an asset if the derivative
depends on that asset. If the derivatives are for sale to the public, then the seller must make this graph public.
Now consider a seller who knows that certain underlying assets are lemons. For certain derivatives, it is
advantageous for the seller to concentrate many of these lemons into a small number of derivatives. Thus,
these lemons and the lemon-loaded derivatives will correspond to a dense subgraph of the original graph.
Arora et al. observed that if it is computationally intractable to check whether an arbitrary graph (or even a
somewhat random graph) contains a dense subgraph, then it is computationally intractable to catch such a
dishonest seller. Therefore, the lemon cost could be quite high.
Specifically, suppose there is no polynomial-time algorithm that distinguishes between random graphs
and random graphs with a planted dense subgraph. Say there are ℓ lemons. Arora et al. use the fact that the
lemon cost is the value without any lemons minus the value with lemons. They show that while the lemon
cost for a rational, time-unbounded buyer who can distinguish the above graphs is o(ℓ), the lemon cost for a
polynomial-time bounded buyer will actually be ω(ℓ).
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We circumvent this problem. Instead of allowing the seller to use an arbitrary bipartite graph to con-
struct the CDO family, we mandate that the seller use a specific bipartite graph. Of course, the buyer can
easily check that the seller did use the specified graph. While the seller will still be able to assign assets
to nodes arbitrarily, we can choose the graph judiciously to avoid the dense subgraph problem, for the fol-
lowing reason. Although it may be computationally intractable to test whether an arbitrary graph, or even
a somewhat-random graph, contains a dense subgraph, it is nevertheless possible to explicitly construct a
graph with no dense subgraphs. We choose such a graph for the seller.
Graphs with no dense subgraphs are related to certain fundamental objects in the theory of pseudoran-
domness: randomness extractors and expander graphs. For a survey of these objects and other aspects of
pseudorandomness, see [Vad07].
The reader may wonder who is requiring the use of such a graph. Since we show that a seller can’t gain
much by strategically placing lemons for such a graph, a seller may be motivated to use such a graph to
attract buyers. Alternatively, a regulator might mandate the use of such a graph. Financial authorities have
tried to encourage the transparency of financial products since the 2008 crisis, and our CDO constructions
could help contribute towards this worthy goal.
Our constructions motivate the notion of what we call a pseudorandom derivative family. This is a set of
derivatives such that no matter how the lemons are placed by an adversary, the sum of the value changes of
the derivatives will be small. In other words, adversarial placement of lemons behaves similarly to random
placement.
Alternatively, we may decompose the lemon cost into the unavoidable lemon cost plus the cost of dis-
honest placement. The unavoidable lemon cost is the lemon cost for an honest seller who randomly places
the lemons. The cost of dishonest placement is the additional cost from a dishonest seller who strategically
places the lemons. A pseudorandom derivative family is one where the cost of dishonest placement is small.
One could imagine a few methods to force the seller to package the CDOs randomly. For example, the
seller could use a cryptographic hash function of the current time. However, this still allows the seller some
flexibility, in that the seller may choose various different times, and even different naming of the assets,
to find the most profitable lemon placement. Alternatively, the seller could use some fixed seemingly-
pseudorandom string, such as the digits of π, but there is no guarantee that the digits of π will have the
desired property.
In our main result, we show how to construct good pseudorandom derivative families, using expander
graphs with expansion close to the degree. Moreover, this is certifiably pseudorandom, in the sense that
there is a proof that the CDO packaging is close to fair. In other words, there is zero chance of an unfair
packaging, whereas with a cryptographic method there would be a positive chance of an unfair packaging.
Of course, in order to analyze values we need a model for the underlying assets. Arora et al. assume
the underlying assets are independent fair coin flips, taking the value 1 with probability 1/2, whereas the
lemons always take value 0. As their result was negative, a simpler model gives a stronger result. However,
we strive for a positive result, so we analyze a more realistic model with dependencies.
We use the factor framework, which is a common way to model CDOs (see [CL08] for an overview). All
dependencies among the assets occur through a global random variable Z that represents a set of “factors.”
For example, these factors could include the the state of the economy and housing market. Many papers
are written where there is just one 1-dimensional factor, but our model is more general in that we make no
assumptions about Z . Conditioned on Z , all assets are independent.
Furthermore, we only require that the probability distribution on any r assets depends solely on how
many of the assets are lemons. We also don’t need to assume lemons have value 0. Rather, for our strongest
results, we assume that for any fixing of the global random variable, good assets first-order stochastically
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dominate lemons (see Subsection 2.1).
With this as our model, we study arbitrary tranches of CDOs. We obtain an error bound of 2∆/d times
the trivial bound, where d is the left degree and small sets on the left expand by a factor of d − ∆. There
are explicit constructions where this is o(1). We obtain even stronger results for the entire CDO. Arora et
al. analyze only senior tranches of CDOs.
Related Work. After the preliminary version of this paper, there has been more related work on the compu-
tational complexity of financial products. Braverman and Pasricha showed that pricing compound options
(options of options) can be computationally intractable, in fact PSPACE-hard [BP14]. Hemenway and
Khanna proved that it is computationally intractable to estimate the number of failures caused by a small
shock to a financial system [HK16]. Schuldenzucker, Seuken, and Battiston showed how the computational
complexity of clearing financial networks can be greatly increased once banks enter into credit default swaps
[SSB17]. We believe there is a lot more to be explored at the intersection of finance and the theory of com-
putation.
Organization. We begin by explaining our model and defining key terms in Section 2. We then describe
how expander graphs give pseudorandom CDOs in Section 3. We modify existing expander constructions to
obtain our CDOs in Section 4. Finally, we analyze the case when good assets don’t necessarily stochastically
dominate lemons in Section 5.
2 The Model and Key Definitions
First we give some notation. For a positive integer n, we let [n] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. For a vector
v = (v1, . . . , vs), we let ‖v‖1 =
∑
i |vi| be the L1 norm.
Our CDOswill be functions of underlying assets. We first describe our assumptions about the underlying
assets, and then define pseudorandom CDOs.
2.1 Model for Underlying Assets
In our model, there are two types of assets, lemons and good assets. Good assets must first-order stochasti-
cally dominate lemons in a sense below. This requirement will be satisfied if lemons always take value zero,
but it allows more general distributions on lemons. Each CDO will depend on r assets. Our results hold as
long as the probability distribution on any r assets depends only on how many of the assets are lemons.
We now elaborate on one natural model which satisfies the two requirements above. We model de-
pendencies among assets as occurring through some global random variable Z . This Z represents a set of
factors, such as the state of the economy and housing market. We make no assumptions about Z . For each
fixing of Z , to say z, there are two probability distributions Dg = Dg(z) and Dℓ = Dℓ(z). Conditioned on
Z = z, our model assumes all assets are independent, with good assets chosen according toDg , and lemons
chosen according toDℓ. Moreover, we say good assets first-order stochastically dominate lemons if for any
z and a,
Pr
X∼Dg(z)
[X ≥ a] ≥ Pr
Y∼Dℓ(z)
[Y ≥ a].
We can relax the requirement that assets are conditionally independent. It suffices that the conditional
distribution on assets is r-wise independent, i.e., any r of them are independent. (This does not imply that
they are mutually independent.)
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We normalize asset values so that each asset’s maximum value is 1. We let µ and λ be the expected
values of each good asset and lemon, respectively. The dominance requirement implies µ ≥ λ, and let
δ = µ− λ be the additional expected value of a good asset.
2.2 Pseudorandom CDOs
Definition 2.1. A collateralized debt obligation (CDO) is a derivative on an underlying portfolio of assets.
For 0 = a0 < a1 < . . . < as (called attachment points), the ith tranche is given by the interval [ai−1, ai].
If the underlying portfolio pays off x, then the value of the ith tranche is value[ai−1,ai](x) = min(x, ai) −
min(x, ai−1). If the tranche is understood, we often omit it as a subscript in value.
Since assets are normalized to have maximum value 1, if the CDO depends on r assets, the last attach-
ment point is as = r.
We will be interested in families of CDOs.
Definition 2.2. An (n,m, r)-CDO family is a set of m CDOs on n assets identified with the set [n], where
each CDO depends on r assets.
We will have n≪ mr, so that each asset underlies several derivatives.
The seller (creator of the CDOs) knows that some ℓ assets are lemons, and may identify the lemons with
any subset L ⊆ [n] of size ℓ. We will be interested in the total value of tranches in our CDO family.
Definition 2.3. For L ⊆ [n], let tval[a,b](L) denote the total expected value of all [a, b] tranches in the CDO
family, if the assets corresponding to assets L are lemons. If the tranche is understood, we often omit it as a
subscript. We define the vector ~tval(L) = (tval[a0,a1](L), tval[a1,a2](L), . . . , tval[as−1,as](L)).
A dishonest seller will try to choose the subset L to minimize tval(L). For example, Arora et al. assume
that the seller retains all junior tranches, to signal that his assets are high quality. He then has an incentive
to concentrate risk in some senior tranches, minimizing the value of these tranches. A CDO family is
pseudorandom if the seller cannot gain significantly by this choice. In the scenario envisioned by Arora et
al., we want pseudorandomness with respect to the senior tranches.
Definition 2.4. An (n,m, r)-CDO family is pseudorandom for ℓ lemons for [a, b] tranches with error ǫ if for
any two subsets L,L′ ⊆ [n] of size ℓ,
| tval[a,b](L
′)− tval[a,b](L)| ≤ ǫm(b− a).
Note that m(b − a) is the maximum possible value of the [a, b] tranches with no lemons. Thus, for any
CDO family the error ǫ is at most 1.
We further define pseudorandomness for the entire CDO family. We can’t generalize the above definition
naively, to say that the total value of the CDO doesn’t change significantly if the lemons are moved. This is
because the total value of the CDO equals the total value of the underlying assets; therefore moving lemons
won’t change the value at all. Instead, we strengthen the definition to ensure that not much value can be
transferred among the different tranches. That is, we add up the value changes of each tranche; this gives
the L1-norm.
Definition 2.5. An (n,m, r)-CDO family is pseudorandom for ℓ lemons with error ǫ if for any two subsets
L,L′ ⊆ [n] of size ℓ,
‖ ~tval(L′)− ~tval(L)‖1 ≤ ǫmr.
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Note that mr is the maximum possible value of the entire CDO family with no lemons. The error ǫ for
the CDO family is at most the maximum error for a tranche, and hence at most 1.
We can compare our notion of pseudorandom error to the traditional notion of lemon cost. The lemon
cost is the value without any lemons minus the value with lemons. In a sense, we are dividing the lemon cost
into two components: the unavoidable lemon cost plus the cost of dishonest placement. The unavoidable
lemon cost is the lemon cost for an honest seller who randomly places the lemons. The cost of dishonest
placement is the additional cost from a dishonest seller who strategically places the lemons. Thus, the
normalized cost of dishonest placement is upper bounded by the pseudorandom error.
On the other hand, the pseudorandom error above is at most the normalized lemon cost, but it could be
significantly less. For example, if all underlying assets are lemons, the lemon cost will be high, but the error
in our definition will be 0, since the value doesn’t change depending on the lemon placement. Indeed, the
pseudorandom error is small if the lemon cost doesn’t depend significantly on the lemon placement.
2.3 Bipartite Expander Graphs
Following Arora et al., we view the relationship between derivatives and underlying assets as a bipartite
graph. We review the basic definitions.
Definition 2.6. A bipartite graph is a triple (A,B,E), with left vertices A, right vertices B, and edges
E ⊆ A × B. We usually view E as unordered pairs of vertices. Sometimes we refer to a bipartite graph
on A ∪B to mean some bipartite graph (A,B,E) with suitable choice of edges E. For a subset of vertices
S ⊆ A ∪ B, let Γ(S) = {v|(∃w ∈ S){v,w} ∈ E} denote the set of neighbors of S. We often write Γ(v)
for Γ({v}). The degree of a vertex v is |Γ(v)|. The graph is d-left-regular if all left vertices have degree d,
and similarly for right-regular. The graph is (d, r)-biregular if it is d-left-regular and r-right-regular.
The vertices A and B correspond to the assets and derivatives, respectively, with an edge between a
derivative vertex and asset vertex if the derivative depends on the asset.
Since Arora et al. showed how dense subgraphs can be problematic, we choose a graph with no dense
subgraphs. It is natural to use known constructions of suitable “randomness extractors,” which can be shown
to lack dense subgraphs. Indeed, this was our original approach. However, we obtain stronger results in a
simpler manner by considering the related expander graphs, where we require expansion of asset vertices.
Definition 2.7. A bipartite graph on [n] ∪ [m] is an (ℓmax, γ)-expander if for every subset S ⊆ [n] of size
at most ℓmax, |Γ(S)| ≥ γ|S|.
Note that we only need expansion of left vertices; expansion of right vertices is not required. We will
need a strong form of an expander, called a unique-neighbor expander.
Definition 2.8. Let Γi(S) denote the set of vertices v ∈ Γ(S) with |Γ(v) ∩ S| = i. Γ1(S) are called the
unique neighbors of S.
Definition 2.9. A bipartite graph on [n]∪ [m] is an (ℓmax, γ)-unique-neighbor expander if for every subset
S ⊆ [n] of size at most ℓmax, |Γ1(S)| ≥ γ|S|.
Note that to obtain unique neighbor expansion, the graph left-degree can’t be too large. Specifically, we
must have ℓmaxd < m. In other words, each asset participates in somewhat few derivatives. This seems
natural enough, although in the Future Work section we discuss trying to handle the case when this is false.
The following simple lemma is well known.
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Lemma 2.10. A d-left-regular (ℓmax, d−∆)-expander is an (ℓmax, d− 2∆)-unique neighbor expander.
Proof. Consider any subset S on the left of size ℓ ≤ ℓmax. It has at least (d−∆)ℓ neighbors, which leaves
at most ∆ℓ edges unaccounted for. Thus |Γ1(S)| ≥ |Γ(S)| −∆ℓ, as required.
It is well known that most graphs are excellent expanders, which can be proven using the probabilistic
method. However, we need to be able to certify that a graph is an expander. It appears hard to do this for
arbitrary graphs, which is related to Arora et al. impossibility results. However, we can construct explicit
expanders that are quite strong, though not as good as the non-explicit expanders for our purposes.
Explicit expander constructions are highly nontrivial. The classic constructions of Margulis [Mar73,
Mar88], Gabber and Galil [GG81], and Lubotzky-Phillips-Sarnak [LPS88] are not known to give unique-
neighbor expanders. Ta-Shma, Umans, and Zuckerman constructed the first unique-neighbor expanders
of polylogarithmic left degree [TUZ07], and Capalbo et al. were the first to achieve constant left degree
[CRVW02]. For our purposes, the best expanders were constructed by Guruswami, Umans, and Vadhan
[GUV09], although these have polylogarithmic degree. For more on expanders we refer the reader to the
excellent survey [HLW06].
3 Expanders Give Pseudorandom CDOs
Before discussing expander constructions, we first show how unique-neighbor expanders give pseudoran-
dom CDOs. It is helpful to compare our bounds to a natural trivial bound. To this end, observe that any
biregular (n,m, r)-CDO family is pseudorandom against ℓ lemons for [a, b] tranches with error at most
dℓδ/(m(b − a)). (Recall that δ is the difference between the expected values of a good asset and lemon.)
This is because converting ℓ good assets to lemons decreases the value of the entire CDO family by dℓδ,
since each lemon is in d CDOs.
We show that a CDO family built from a (d, r)-biregular (ℓ, d−∆)-unique neighbor expander has error
at most ∆ℓδ/(m(b − a)). That is, we replace d from the trivial bound by ∆. Moreover, the naive bound on
the error for the entire CDO is the maximum of the errors for each tranche. We are instead able to improve
the error to 2∆ℓδ/(mr).
The intuition for the proof is natural. We consider some placement of lemons. By the unique-neighbor
expansion, we have fairly tight bounds on both the number of derivatives containing no lemons, and the
number containing exactly one lemon. Thus, when we subtract values for two different lemon placements,
there is a lot of cancellation.
Theorem 3.1. A CDO built from a (d, r)-biregular (ℓ, d −∆)-unique neighbor expander is pseudorandom
for ℓ lemons. For the tranche [a, b], the error is at most ∆ℓδ/(m(b − a)), and for the entire CDO the error
is at most 2∆ℓδ/(mr).
Before beginning the proof, we recall that value is the tranche value as defined in Definition 2.1, and
define the following.
Definition 3.2. Let val[a,b](g) = E[value[a,b](X)], where the random variable X is the payoff of an un-
derlying portfolio on r assets, g of which are good. If the tranche is understood, we often omit it as a
subscript.
Since good assets first-order stochastically dominate lemons, we deduce that val is a nondecreasing
function of g. This is obvious if lemons always take value zero, but requires a short proof in general.
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Lemma 3.3. For any tranche [a, b] and g′ ≥ g, val[a,b](g
′) ≥ val[a,b](g).
Proof. First fix Z = z. Now let FD denote the cumulative distribution function of distribution D. We can
choose random variables X and Y according to Dg = Dg(z) and Dℓ = Dℓ(z), respectively, by choosing
W ∈ [0, 1] uniformly and outputtingX = F−1Dg (W ) and Y = F
−1
Dℓ
(W ). This “coupling” and the domination
condition imply that for every point in the probability space, X ≥ Y . Thus, we may substitute good assets
for lemons in such a way that for any point in the probability space, the value of every asset either increases
or remains the same. The lemma follows.
Recall that µ and λ are the expected values of each good asset and lemon, respectively, and δ = µ − λ.
Since a CDO simply restructures payoffs, the sum of the expected payoffs of the CDO equals the sum of the
payoffs of the underlying assets, implying the following observation.
Observation 3.4. For any g,
∑s
i=1 val[ai−1,ai](g) = gµ+ (r − g)λ = rλ+ gδ.
Lemma 3.3 and Observation 3.4 imply the following corollary.
Corollary 3.5. For any g, i, and tranche [a, b], 0 ≤ val[a,b](g + i)− val[a,b](g) ≤ iδ.
Let ti(L) = |Γi(L)|, for 0 ≤ i ≤ r. The following lemma sets up an expression for the error.
Lemma 3.6. Fix a tranche [a, b] and any L,L′ ⊆ [n] with |L| = |L′| = ℓ. Then:
tval(L′)− tval(L) =
r∑
i=1
(ti(L)− ti(L
′))(val(r)− val(r − i)).
Proof. Since ∪ri=0Γi(L) = [m], we have
∑r
i=0 ti(L) = m.
Observe that
tval(L) =
r∑
i=0
ti(L) val(r − i).
Using
∑r
i=0(ti(L)− ti(L
′)) = 0, we obtain
tval(L′)− tval(L) =
r∑
i=0
(ti(L)− ti(L
′))(− val(r − i))
=
r∑
i=0
(ti(L)− ti(L
′))(val(r)− val(r − i)).
Observing that the first term in the sum is zero gives the lemma.
The following inequality will be useful.
Lemma 3.7. Suppose ui ∈ [−β, β], vi ∈ [0, δ] for i = 1, 2, . . . , r, and that
r∑
i=1
ui = 0, (1)
r∑
i=2
|ui| ≤ β. (2)
Then ∣∣∣∣∣
r∑
i=1
uivi
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ βδ.
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Before proving this lemma, we show how the lemma implies the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.1, single tranche. Fix the tranche [a, b], and we now bound its error. We apply Lemma 3.7
with
ui = i(ti(L)− ti(L
′)),
vi = (val(r)− val(r − i))/i,
β = ∆ℓ.
First note that
r∑
i=1
iti(L) = dℓ,
since both sides count the number of edges incident to L. Therefore Equation (1) is satisfied. To see that
Equation (2) and |u1| ≤ β are satisfied, observe that t1(L), t1(L
′) ≥ (d−∆)ℓ, and so
r∑
i=2
iti(L) ≤ ∆ℓ,
and similarly for L′. Corollary 3.5 shows that 0 ≤ vi ≤ δ. By Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7, we conclude that
| tval(L′)− tval(L)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
r∑
i=1
uivi
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ βδ = ∆ℓδ.
Dividing bym(b− a) gives the result for the [a, b] tranche.
We now prove the inequality.
Proof of Lemma 3.7. Assume without loss of generality that u1 ≥ 0. Using Equation (1), we get
∑
i:ui≥0
ui =
∑
i:ui<0
|ui| ≤
∑
i>1
|ui| ≤ β.
Therefore,
r∑
i=1
uivi ≤
∑
i:ui≥0
uivi ≤ max
i
{vi}
∑
i:ui≥0
ui ≤ δβ.
Similarly,
r∑
i=1
uivi ≥
∑
i:ui<0
uivi ≥ max
i
{vi}
∑
i:ui<0
ui ≥ δ(−β).
To analyze the error for the entire CDO, we use the following generalization of Lemma 3.7.
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Lemma 3.8. Suppose ui ∈ [−β, β], vij ∈ [0, δ] for i = 1, 2, . . . , r, and that
r∑
i=1
ui = 0, (3)
r∑
i=2
|ui| ≤ β. (4)
(∀i)
s∑
j=1
vij ≤ δ. (5)
Then
s∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
r∑
i=1
uivij
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2βδ.
Before proving this lemma, we complete the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.1, entire CDO. We now apply Lemma 3.8 with the same choices of ui and β as before,
and with
vij = (val[aj−1,aj ](r)− val[aj−1,aj ](r − i))/i.
Observation 3.4 implies that Equation (5) is satisfied, and the rest of the assumptions of Lemma 3.8 are
satisfied as before. We therefore obtain:
‖ ~tval(L′)− ~tval(L)‖1 =
s∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
r∑
i=1
uivij
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2βδ = 2∆ℓδ.
Dividing bymr = dn gives the required result.
We now prove the more general inequality.
Proof of Lemma 3.8. Observe that
s∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
r∑
i=1
uivij
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
i,j
|uivij |
=
∑
i:ui≥0
ui
∑
j
vij +
∑
i:ui<0
|ui|
∑
j
vij
≤ βδ + βδ.
The last inequality comes from the bounds proved in Lemma 3.7 that
∑
i:ui≥0
ui =
∑
i:ui<0
|ui| ≤
∑
i>1
|ui| ≤ β.
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4 Constructive Expanders and CDOs
As stated earlier, despite the fact that almost all graphs have excellent expansion properties, it is difficult
to certify this efficiently for arbitrary graphs. We therefore use the best known explicit expanders to build
our pseudorandom CDOs. For our purposes, the best explicit expanders are those by Guruswami, Umans,
and Vadhan [GUV09]. We use Lemma 2.10 to go from expansion close to the degree to unique neighbor
expansion. This section is mostly about choosing the right parameters, and modifying the above graphs to
ensure that they are biregular.
Theorem 4.1. For any α ∈ (0, 1] and positive integers n,m, d, r such that nd = mr, the following holds
for ∆ = 2(2d)α(logd n) logdm and any positive integer ℓmax ≤ (∆m/(8d
3))α. There is an explicit
pseudorandom (n,m, r)-CDO family against ℓ lemons, for all ℓ ≤ ℓmax. For the tranche [a, b], the error is
at most 2∆ℓδ/(m(b − a)), and for the entire CDO the error is at most 4∆ℓδ/(mr).
To prove this, we use the strong and elegant expander construction of Guruswami, Umans, and Vadhan
[GUV09]. We will set parameters in a different order, so we use their Theorem 3.3, obtained before they set
parameters.
Theorem 4.2. [GUV09] For h any positive integer, q a power of 2, and n and m powers of q, there is an
explicit construction of an (ℓmax, q −∆) expander on [n] ∪ [m] with left degree q, ℓmax = h
logq m−1, and
∆ = (h− 1)(logq n− 1)(logqm− 1).
Before setting parameters, we need the following simple observation.
Observation 4.3. Suppose we are given an (ℓmax, d−∆) expander with left-degree d. If we remove any left
vertices, and add any right vertices, the graph remains an (ℓmax, d−∆) expander. If for each left vertex, we
remove an arbitrary d− d′ edges, then the graph becomes an (ℓmax, d
′ −∆) expander with left degree d′.
We now set parameters from Theorem 4.2 as follows.
Corollary 4.4. For any α ∈ (0, 1] and positive integers n, m, and d, there is an explicit construction of an
(ℓmax, d−∆) expander on [n]∪[m]with left degree d for ℓmax = (m/(4d
2))α and∆ = (2d)α(logd n) logdm.
Proof. Let q be the smallest power of 2 that is at least d. Let n′ be the smallest power of q at least n, and
let m′ be the largest power of q at most m. By Observation 4.3, it suffices to construct a (ℓmax, q − ∆)
expander on [n′] ∪ [m′] with left-degree q. Set h = ⌈qα⌉ and ℓ = logqm
′ = ⌊logqm⌋, so q
ℓ ≤ m < qℓ+1.
We use the expander constructed in Theorem 4.2. It suffices to lower bound ℓmax and upper bound ∆. We
get:
ℓmax ≥ h
ℓ−1 ≥ qα(ℓ−1) > (m/q2)α ≥ (m/(4d2))α,
and
∆ ≤ (h− 1)(logq n
′ − 1)(logqm
′ − 1)
< qα(logq n) logqm < (2d)
α(logd n) logdm.
This completes the proof.
This and other known unique-neighbor expander constructions give left-regular graphs. However, we
need the graph to be biregular. We show how to convert a left-regular graph to biregular while increasing the
left-degree only slightly, at the expense of increasing the number of right vertices. The following extends a
lemma from [GLW10].
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Lemma 4.5. Suppose we are given a d0-left-regular (ℓmax, γ) expander on [n] ∪ [m0], and parameters
m,d, r such that nd = mr, d0 < d ≤ m0, and m ≥ m0d/(d − d0). We can efficiently construct a
(d, r)-biregular (ℓmax, γ) expander on [n] ∪ [m].
Proof. Let r0 = nd0/m0 denote the original average right degree. For any right node v ∈ [m0] of degree
rv > r, divide it into ⌈rv/r⌉ vertices, where ⌊rv/r⌋ have degree r and at most one has degree less than r.
(Partition neighbors arbitrarily.)
The number of new nodes added is at most
∑
v∈[m0]
(⌈rv
r
⌉
− 1
)
<
∑
v∈[m0]
rv
r
=
m0r0
r
=
nd0m
nd
=
d0m
d
.
Thus, the total number of right nodes is less than
m0 +
d0
d
m ≤
d− d0
d
m+
d0
d
m = m.
Add isolated nodes to the right to make the total number of right nodes exactly m. Now add edges
arbitrarily to the right and left to make all left degree d and right degrees r, which is possible because
nd = mr. Naively, this may allow multiple edges, but we can avoid this by filling edge slots in the
following order. For left nodes, cycle over all nodes d − d0 times, filling one edge slot each time. For right
nodes, cycle over all nodes once, filling all edge slots for a node before proceeding to the next node.
Corollary 4.6. For any α ∈ (0, 1] and positive integers n,m, d, and r such that nd = mr, there is an explicit
construction of a (d, r)-biregular (ℓmax, d−∆) expander on [n]∪ [m] for∆ = 2(2d)
α(logd n) logdm and
ℓmax = (∆m/(8d
3))α.
Proof. Set∆0 = ∆/2, d0 = d−∆0, andm0 = ∆0m/d. By Corollary 4.4, there is an explicit construction
of a (ℓmax, d0 − ∆
′
0) expander on [n] ∪ [m0] with left degree d0 for ℓ
′
max = (m0/(4d
2
0))
α ≥ ℓmax and
∆′0 = (2d0)
α(logd n) logdm0 ≤ ∆0. Now apply Lemma 4.5.
Combining Corollary 4.6 and Lemma 2.10 with Theorem 3.1 yields Theorem 4.1.
If d is smaller, we could use the expanders of [CRVW02], but the degree is not as good a function in the
error and our results are not as strong.
We remark that our required notion of explicitness is weaker than one often considered in the litera-
ture and achieved in the above constructions. We just need the whole graph to be efficiently constructible,
whereas sometimes one needs the ith neighbor of a node to be computable very quickly, say in time poly-
logarithmic in the number of nodes.
5 Two General Assets
In this section we obtain bounds even if the probability distribution of lemons is not stochastically dominated
by the probability distribution of good assets. We only assume that µ ≥ λ, where µ and λ are the expected
values of each good asset and lemon, respectively. We don’t need to think of the second asset as a lemon;
instead consider two general assets with expected values µ ≥ λ. Of course, in this more general setting our
results our weaker. Now, even the “trivial” bounds change; such bounds can be deduced from our bounds
below. We show that in the general case, the δ in Theorem 3.1 must be replaced by µ for the [a, b] tranche.
Moreover, we no longer get better bounds for the entire CDO than can be deduced from the bounds in the
tranches.
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Theorem 5.1. A CDO built from a (d, r)-biregular (ℓ, d −∆)-unique neighbor expander is pseudorandom
for ℓ lemons. For the tranche [a, b], the error is at most ∆ℓµ/(m(b− a)).
In this case, Lemma 3.3 may no longer hold, and as a result, neither may Corollary 3.5. We instead
obtain an analog of Corollary 3.5 with δ replaced by µ.
Lemma 5.2. For any g, i, and tranche [a, b], | val[a,b](g + i)− val[a,b](g)| ≤ iµ.
To prove this, it is helpful to use the following expression for the value of the [a, b] tranche.
Observation 5.3. LetX denote a random variable representing the payoff of a portfolio underlying a CDO.
Then the value of the corresponding [a, b] tranche is
∫ b
a
Pr[X > x]dx.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. It suffices to prove the lemma for i = 1. Let X be the payoff of a portfolio on r − 1
assets, g of which are good. Let Y be the payoff of a good asset, and Z the payoff of a lemon. We wish to
show that ∣∣∣∣
∫ b
a
Pr[X + Y > w]dw −
∫ b
a
Pr[X + Z > w]dw
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ.
To this end, first note that
∫ b
a
Pr[X + Y > w]dw ≥
∫ b
a
Pr[X > w]dw,
and similarly for X + Z , since both Y and Z are nonnegative. It therefore suffices to show that
∫ b
a
Pr[X + Y > w]dw −
∫ b
a
Pr[X > w]dw ≤ µ,
and hence the corresponding inequality for X + Z .
Condition onX = x; we show this inequality for any x. Observe that
Pr[x+ Y > w]− Pr[x > w] =
{
Pr[Y > w − x] if x ≤ w
0 otherwise
Letting y = w − x gives:
∫ b
a
(Pr[x+ Y > w]− Pr[x > w]) dw ≤
∫ ∞
0
Pr[Y > y]dy = µ.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We now proceed as in our earlier proof, replacing Corollary 3.5 with Lemma 5.2.
Everything else goes through as before.
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6 Conclusions and Future Work
We used expander graphs to construct pseudorandom derivative families, whose values cannot be manipu-
lated by strategic lemon placement. We analyze our construction under a fairly general model with two types
of assets, where good assets first-order stochastically dominating lemons. For future work, can our bounds
be improved? Unique-neighbor expansion is fairly strong; can we obtain good bounds under a weaker con-
dition? For example, perhaps a seller wishes to place each asset in more derivatives, so the graph is denser.
Then it’s natural to require the graph to be a “randomness extractor.” Can we obtain bounds for such graphs?
There are several directions to try to generalize our results. Can we analyze the case when good assets
can have different distributions, as can the lemons? We can still assume that each good asset first-order
stochastically dominates each lemon. This case can arise in practice because banks may use different assets
that have different risk profiles. Unlike for lemons, the risk profiles of the good assets are public information.
What if the graph is not left-regular? This corresponds to some assets appearing in fewer CDOs than
others, which is natural if they are “smaller.”
In Section 5, we remove the stochastic domination assumption and obtain weaker results. For future
work, one could try to make some other assumptions besides stochastic domination. For example, what if
one of the distributions is a mean-preserving spread of the other?
Another direction would be to allow more general dependencies than that given by the factor framework.
Finally, we could try to analyze a more complex derivative that banks created and sold: CDOs squared.
A CDO squared is a CDO whose underlying assets are themselves tranches of CDOs.
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